



General Certificate of Education

Philosophy

Unit 4 – Philosophical Problems

[PHIL4]

Specimen mark scheme for examinations in June 2010 onwards
This mark scheme uses the [new numbering system](#)

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GCE PHILOSOPHY UNIT 4

GENERIC MARK SCHEME for part (a) questions (Total: 15 marks)

	Knowledge and Understanding	Interpretation, Analysis and Application
	AO1	AO2
Level 2	<p>5–8 marks</p> <p>At the top end of this level, there is a clear grasp of textual material. Detail must be present.</p> <p>At the lower end of this level subtle detail may be lacking without affecting the general grasp of the material.</p> <p>Philosophical sophistication should be present at the top end of the level.</p>	<p>4–7 marks</p> <p>At the top end, relevance will be sustained. Examples are appropriate and their implications made apparent.</p> <p>Some detail may be lacking at the lower end of the level.</p> <p>Textual material is applied in a directed manner regarding the requirements of the question.</p>
Level 1	<p>1–4 marks</p> <p>There is a partial grasp of arguments/positions. Detail is omitted.</p> <p>At the bottom end of this level there is little grasp of the material. At the top end a grasp of at least one topical idea is in evidence.</p>	<p>1–3 marks</p> <p>Analysis of arguments or positions is partial or lacking. Examples are not fully analysed. Implications may not be drawn out.</p> <p>The response may not always sustain relevance and there may be misinterpretation of key ideas.</p>
0 marks	No relevant philosophical points.	No relevant philosophical points.

GCE PHILOSOPHY UNIT 4

GENERIC MARK SCHEME for part (b) questions (Total: 45 marks)

	AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	AO3: Assessment and Evaluation
Level 5			<p>20–24 marks</p> <p>The evaluation displays accuracy and penetration. At least two arguments are treated in detail. A sophisticated grasp of the issues is apparent. Depth is demonstrated through the exploration of points, examples and their implications. Counter-arguments are considered. Positions are argued for and clearly related to the material discussed.</p> <p>The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any, errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole.</p>
Level 4			<p>15–19 marks</p> <p>There is an accurate and developed treatment of at least one argument. Counter argument is in evidence. A detailed treatment is expected at the top end of this level. Alternatively, a range of arguments may be present but a detailed treatment is lacking. Examples and counter-examples are used evaluatively. The assessment shows a sophisticated grasp of a position.</p> <p>The response is legible, and technical language is employed with partial success. There may be occasional errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar and the response reads as a coherent whole.</p>

GCE PHILOSOPHY UNIT 4

GENERIC MARK SCHEME for part (b) questions continued

	AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	AO3: Assessment and Evaluation
Level 3	<p>8–10 marks There will be a clear grasp of the issues with appropriate detail. The text will have been engaged. Key positions/arguments are presented with clarity and philosophical sophistication.</p>	<p>9–11 marks The analysis is detailed. Examples are well constructed and their implications are apparent. Textual material is appropriately directed and relevance sustained.</p>	<p>9–14 marks At the top end of this level there is clear grasp of evaluative issues, but the assessment lacks penetration. There may be a juxtaposition of contrasting stances rather than developed assessment of a position. Use of examples may be limited to illustration with evaluative issues underdeveloped. This features strongly at the lower end of this level. Generality, rather than detailed treatment is likely to be a dominant characteristic. The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.</p>
Level 2	<p>4–7 marks There is a general grasp of the material shading into a basic grasp at the lower end. Textual detail is lacking. At the top end of this level a clear understanding of at least one argument must be present.</p>	<p>5–8 marks Examples or analogies should be present. The implications may not be fully drawn out but there is a clear sense of directedness. Detail is present at the top end, though the analysis as a whole may lack sophistication or be characterised as 'general'.</p>	<p>5–8 marks Evaluative points may be asserted rather than argued. There is little development of points and examples might be met with counter-assertions. Some arguments might be tangential. Sophistication may be lacking. The response may be legible, with a basic attempt to employ technical language, which may not be appropriate. There may be frequent errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.</p>
Level 1	<p>1–3 marks A rudimentary or fragmentary grasp of the material is in evidence. Textual detail is lacking or misunderstood. At the top end a partial grasp of an argument or position must be in evidence.</p>	<p>1–4 marks The material may not directly impinge on the question. Examples are not fully analysed or explained. At the lower end of this level material may be misinterpreted. The analysis might be characterised as 'basic'.</p>	<p>1–4 marks Evaluation is misdirected or lacking in any detail. Arguments may be weak or absent. There is no development of issues. At the top end of this level there must be an indication of one evaluative issue. Technical language may not be employed, or it may be used inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive.</p>
0 marks	No relevant philosophical points.	No relevant philosophical points.	No relevant philosophical points.

SECTION A: HUME**Total for this question: (60 marks)**

01	Outline and illustrate the two kinds of knowledge distinguished by Hume. (15 marks)
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Assessment Objective 1: 0–8 marks**Assessment Objective 2: 0–7 marks**

Hume divides knowledge into two kinds: relations of ideas and matters of fact (Hume's fork).

Relations of ideas: logically certain, demonstrable by the mind. They are known *a priori*. The negation of such propositions is inconceivable/self-contradictory. Examples are likely to be drawn from the truths of logic or mathematics. Their certainty comes at a cost; they do not provide us with any knowledge of the world.

Matters of fact are known through experience, not reason. Whereas relations of ideas are necessarily true and *a priori*, matters of fact are contingently true and *a posteriori*. The contrary of a matter of fact is conceivable by the mind, ie no contradiction is involved in conceiving them to be different. They provide genuine knowledge of the world and are founded on the relation of cause and effect. Examples are likely to be drawn from every day experience and/or science.

EITHER

02	Critically examine Hume's radical empiricism. (45 marks)
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Assessment Objective 1: 0–10 marks**Assessment Objective 2: 0–11 marks**

The empiricist thesis: all knowledge about the world is derived from sense impressions. All our ideas are copies of sense impressions which are their causes. Innate ideas are rejected. Complex ideas not met with in experience are explained in terms of the imagination operating on simple ideas which are derived from experience. Hume's challenge is to find an exception. The argument is reinforced by the claim that in the congenital absence of a sense-organ, there is a corresponding absence of the ideas associated with it. There may be further implications, eg principles of association established empirically or the idea of necessary connection having to be based on repetition. There are implications for meaning if no impression can be found for an idea.

Assessment Objective 3: 0–24 marks**Critical Discussion**

- (1) Examples of particular ideas may be selected as possible counter-examples. God is not just human qualities on a grand scale, infinity, abstract ideas such as freedom, general ideas, mathematical operations/relations or concepts – or relations in general.
- (2) Hume's thesis is too particularised – the fact that our ideas/impressions can be subdivided does not imply that we perceive in this way.

- (3) The copy principle is inadequate. It fails to take into account the organisational features of mind. Such features are needed for knowledge, structured experience, prediction, extrapolation, comparison, etc. There could be references to Kant or Popper's imaginative leaps of the scientist. Data only becomes data when it is operated on.
- (4) The shades of blue counter-example of Hume's is more damaging than he thinks/dismissed too lightly, eg
- (i) being singular is exactly what a counter to a universal generalisation should be;
 - (ii) is it singular or can it be adapted to anything that admits of gradations;
 - (iii) the problem cannot be solved by appeal to the imagination as its domain is forming complexes not simples.
- (5) On his own principles the idea of necessary connection should have been rejected. Another 'principle of equal weight and authority' is inconsistent with the claim that there is one principle governing the origin of ideas.
- (6) There might be some support for rationalism/innate ideas. Some experiments might be appealed to, eg depth perception, or there might be reference to Chomsky's thesis of innate structures. There might also be support for rationalist claims regarding mathematical knowledge.
- (7) The principles of association fail as an account of thinking. These relations cannot hold between ideas thought of as mental images – only contiguity in time is a possibility.
- (8) There might be some discussion of the problems with cause and effect but this will need to sustain relevance, eg his empiricism leads to scepticism that itself has unacceptable implications.
- (9) The idea/impression distinction is flawed, eg inadequacy of the appeal to force and vivacity or failure to establish that what we are aware of are own impressions.

OR

<p>03 'There is no real conflict between the notions of liberty and necessity.' Assess whether Hume has succeeded in resolving the free will problem. (45 marks)</p>

Assessment Objective 1: 0–10 marks

Assessment Objective 2: 0–11 marks

Longstanding philosophical disputes without resolution indicate a problem with their formulation. Clarification of the key terms is required. Necessity is analysed in terms of regularity or constant conjunction. The regularity we see in nature is also evident in the voluntary acts of man. We just *feel* a compulsion about the former but not the latter. This feeling, however, carries no implication for there being any real difference.

Liberty is seen in terms of the power of acting or not acting according to the determination of the will. Free actions are not subject to constraint. Freedom is distinguished from

randomness. Resolution: an action can be free (not subject to constraint) *and* necessary (regular) hence they are compatible, (sometimes known as soft determinism).

Assessment Objective 3: 0–24 marks

Critical Discussion

- (1) Hume's account of liberty is incompatible with what is essential to a free act, ie the ability to act differently in the same circumstances. For Hume, there would have to be a change in the circumstances. Kant's dictum 'ought implies can' might be discussed.
- (2) The absence of felt constraint is not sufficient for describing an act as free, eg hypnotic trances. Removal of the reference to 'felt' creates further problems, eg how are we to know when such constraints are operating – presumably there is a real difference between them operating and not operating.
- (3) Is 'regularity' all we mean by necessity? If so why do we not regard all regular sequences as necessary? All necessary sequences are regular does not entail that all regular sequences are necessary.
- (4) If there are not real differences between the regular operations of body and the voluntary acts of men, then Hume owes us an explanation of *why* we feel differently about them.
- (5) A distinction needs to be made between reasons and causes and the appropriate frameworks in which they operate.
- (6) The nature and status of the will is left unclear. Is it like any other empirical phenomenon of psychology? Could its determinations be any different without some change in its antecedents?
- (7) Punishment is not just a link in a causal chain – neither is reward. Reference needs to be made to the notion of what is deserved. Such a discussion can be approached from the angle of moral responsibility.
- (8) As an extension of (7) more recent discussions might be referred to, eg Henderich's position: that an action of mine was an effect does not imply that I cannot be held responsible (analogy with legal notion of strict liability). Response: this kind of move fails for two reasons (i) there is a difference between being held responsible and actually being responsible, (ii) strict liability is logically parasitic on genuine cases of responsibility.

SECTION B: PLATO**Total for this question: (60 marks)**

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|-----------|--|-------------------|
| 04 | Outline Socrates' arguments against Thrasymachus' claim that justice is enacting the interest of the stronger. | <i>(15 marks)</i> |
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Assessment Objective 1: 0–8 marks**Assessment Objective 2: 0–7 marks**

The first claim is that justice serves the interest of the stronger party. The enactment of laws furthers the interest of the stronger party ('right' = interest of the stronger party). *But* are rulers infallible? They can make bad laws which are not in their interest. Therefore it is right to do what is *not* in the interest of the stronger party. Therefore it is right to do the opposite of what Thrasymachus says is right.

The second claim switches to what the ruler *thinks* is in his interest, but this is *not* Thrasymachus' point; his argument is that no skilled craftsman makes a mistake *qua* craftsman as when his knowledge fails him, he is no longer skilled. The ruler *qua* ruler is infallible. Socrates argues that each skill has its own particular interest and the purpose of the skill is to further or provide for that interest – analogies doctor/patient, captain/crew. The interest of government is its subjects, so rulers *qua* rulers serve the interests of their subjects, not their own.

EITHER

- | | | |
|-----------|--|-------------------|
| 05 | Explore Plato's thesis that knowledge is of the Forms. | <i>(45 marks)</i> |
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Assessment Objective 1: 0–10 marks**Assessment Objective 2: 0–11 marks**

The critical discussion could be set up through the use of the following points.

Knowledge concerns what is, the Forms. There are likely to be contrasts with belief and ignorance. Similes may be used to illustrate the distinctions, especially the cave and divided line. Knowledge requires infallibility and this would be guaranteed by the Forms.

Knowledge constitutes a different faculty from belief. For Plato, this will mean that their respective objects are also different.

Much of what traditionally counts as knowledge would not be knowledge at all. There might be some discussion of multiplicity and change in regard to the world of sense experience – further illustrations from similes might figure.

Assessment Objective 3: 0–24 marks**Critical Discussion**

- (1) Plato's claim alters our conception of knowledge beyond recognition. It is far too restrictive – we could only be said to know *a priori* propositions. There might be some discussion of alternative accounts of such propositions.

- (2) The failure of the Faculties argument. Even if the faculties are different, it will not follow that their respective objects are.
- (3) There could be a directed and informed criticism of the theory of Forms. This needs to consist of more than assertions that there is no empirical evidence for them. Examples of approaches would be third man arguments. Aristotelian criticisms regarding universals, or does every object have a Form?
- (4) Plato's claim that knowledge must concern that which *cannot* be false may have absurd consequences. This could be illustrated with convincing examples.
- (5) An extension of (4) may involve a discussion of the properties of the Forms and why they have any implication for knowledge, eg why should eternal existence carry any implications for what we can be said to know? Is an object more real if it is immutable or indestructible?
- (6) The knowledge/belief distinction should be made within the world of the senses. There might be some discussions of the conditions that are necessary for us to acquire those concepts.
- (7) Plato's thesis implies absolute knowledge in ethics and politics. There could be some discussion of the implications of this.
- (8) Does it make sense to say that anything can be known in the unqualified sense required by Plato?
- (9) The relationship of the Forms to sensible particulars may be explored. Key notions of 'participating' or 'partaking' should be discussed.
- (10) There might be some discussions of the use of similes as opposed to argument. It should, however, be realised that Plato does have arguments.

OR

06 Assess whether Plato was right to distrust democracy. (45 marks)

Assessment Objective 1: 0–10 marks

Assessment Objective 2: 0–11 marks

Candidates might distinguish between direct democracy and modern democracy. There might be some discussion of whether these are differences of degree rather than kind. There is likely to be a discussion of the similes as a way of describing Plato's position. The ship and the beast are likely to figure prominently. Credit should be given for detail and accurate identification of the comparisons, eg ship/ship of state, crew/politicians, etc. The importance of knowledge should be made clear – especially in regard to knowing what is good for people as opposed to merely pandering to their whims.

Assessment Objective 3: 0–24 marks

Critical Discussion

- (1) Candidates may take the view that Plato misrepresents democracy, or at least modern democracy. An educated public is not the same as a rabble.
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- (2) The beast analogy is essentially about control seen in terms of pacification. Democracy does not and should not regard this as the ultimate end of politics.
- (3) As an extension of (2) democratic goals, self-determination and participation, choice, may be regarded as ends in themselves.
- (4) Plato's similes may have some resemblance to electioneering but this is only *one* aspect of the democratic process. There are other aspects of democracy that could be discussed, eg voting in accordance with conscience regardless of public opinion, the ultimate nature of accountability, integrity as opposed to sophistry.
- (5) Alternatively, the similarities between 'sound bites' and pandering are too compelling to ignore.
- (6) Plato has too pessimistic a view of human nature, eg the beast merely reacts rather than judges or the captain of the ship is slow and dull, prisoners in the dark.
- (7) Does Plato have plausible or palatable alternatives? Plato's alternative 'closed' society could be represented by equally damning and lurid similes.
- (8) Experience should teach us the dangers of societies constructed on claims of absolute knowledge. Plato would have more reason to distrust these.
- (9) It is preferable to judge what we want for ourselves, rather than having it imposed externally. This is the only way that the concept of responsibility can get off the ground. There may be general arguments against paternalism, eg Mill – type points regarding plants/growth and machines.
- (10) Why does there have to be *one* good? Metaphysical justifications for this can be discussed. Aristotle's criticisms of the Form of the Good may be used, eg if this cannot be fully attained, it can hardly be the goal of political science.
- (11) Similes are not the same as arguments. *Or* they contain subtle assumptions that need exposing, eg difference between knowledge of means and knowledge of ends.
- (12) Politics is not an exact science and it is a mistake to suppose that it ever can be.
- (13) 'The wise plead and the fools decide' should be taken as an incentive to improve people's understanding.

SECTION C: MILL**Total for this question: (60 marks)**

07 Explain why Mill thought there were dangers inherent in a democracy. (15 marks)

Assessment Objective 1: 0–8 marks**Assessment Objective 2: 0–7 marks**

On the face of it there would not seem to be any problems with the idea of an elected government exercising its power. This is the enactment of the will of the people. However, in practical terms, this ‘will of the people’ will turn out to be the will of the numerically greater or of those who are the most politically active. This can lead to the suppression of minorities. There is therefore a need to limit government powers, even in the case of elected governments.

There is the further danger of social tyranny which is independent of the law. This can consist of current opinion, prejudice or superstition. There is a danger that the majority will dictate on moral issues. Deeply-rooted beliefs that are unquestioned do not have to be right. There may be some reference to stifling the growth of the individual. (There could be some historical remarks regarding limiting the power of a ruler whose interests did not coincide with those of the ruled and the subsequent shift to representative government.)

EITHER

08 ‘The sole justification for interference in individual action is to prevent harm to others.’ Critically explore the implications of this claim. (45 marks)
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Assessment Objective 1: 0–10 marks**Assessment Objective 2: 0–11 marks**

The quote clearly refers to Mill’s Harm Principle. There might be a fuller statement of it; the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. There may also be reference to the individual having sovereignty over his own mind and body. Exceptions to the principle: those not of mature faculties and barbarians. There should be reference to the purpose of the principle, ie to mark off the sphere of individual liberty from legitimate state interference. There might be reference to what Mill thought harm was – physical harm, not offence; textual examples or similar might be provided. Mill’s distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding actions should be apparent. There should also be some discussion of the principle facilitating the growth/development of the individual.

Assessment Objective 3: 0–24 marks**Critical Discussion**

- (1) There are some actions that *need* not involve harm to others and yet state interference is considered appropriate, eg the generation of certain computer images may not involve others at all. The relation between morality and law might be explored. The case of incest could be discussed.

- (2) The implications of Mill's claim for an interdependent society could be explored. Can we always distinguish self- and other-regarding acts? Does Mill's reference to social acts do the work needed? Candidates might discuss whether there might always be some level of description at which there is always a risk. Realistic and problematic examples might profitably be pursued.
- (3) Distinctions might be made between actual, probable and possible harm. How are these measured? Are all of them sufficient conditions for interference? These issues might be discussed in relation to current government practice.
- (4) There are ambiguities in Mill's use of the term 'harm'. If offence does not constitute mental harm, what does? If by 'mental harm' we mean psychological damage, there will be difficulties in establishing the causation. Recent cases, eg religious cartoons, might be discussed. Is physical harm always worse than mental harm?
- (5) Some of Mill's own examples might be discussed – drug-taking, gambling, women's rights, intervention in suicide attempts, slavery – might be discussed, eg there is a problem of consistency in Mill's application of the principle to voluntary slavery. Mill thought that using freedom to surrender freedom involved a paradox. This could be broadened into a discussion of an issue with liberalism: should liberty be used to deny liberty?
- (6) Candidates may approach the discussion from the point of view of Mill's utilitarianism. The principle of utility and the harm principle could conflict. There are difficulties (examples) in operating with two absolute principles.
- (7) Is the harm principle politically suspect? Eg it is exactly what you would expect in a capitalist society. The real emphasis is on producing an ideology which protects and values economic freedom, the elevated status of the free market, fair competition, etc. Mill's liberty is for those who can access it.
- (8) Mill's principle is a demarcation principle and thus borderline cases could be discussed as potentially damaging. It may also be argued that the application of virtually *any* concept can involve borderline cases, but this does not imply that the concept is inherently flawed.
- (9) Candidates may select examples like undermining traditional values, media creation of images, role-models, values, and discuss whether these could involve harm to others.
- (10) Defences of Mill's position, eg he avoids paternalism, moral experts, stunted growth of the individual. Vigilance in regard to liberty is essential to retaining it. Mill is consistent, his account of liberty (or one very similar) are compatible with the notion of man as a progressive being. It is compatible with the ideal of democratic aspiration, ie we assume rationality/responsibility in the election process, so we should do the same in the sphere of individual action.

OR

09 Assess Mill's position on the development of the individual in society. (45 marks)

Assessment Objective 1: 0–10 marks

Assessment Objective 2: 0–11 marks

There are a number of sources that may form the basis of the discussion. Freedom of action/ experiments in living allow us to develop our own mode of being. This is important for its own sake. We should not be sheep-like. Differences in physical and spiritual needs should be catered for. Different people need different stimulations and environments; differences in what gives pleasure and pain. There could be a discussion of Mill's position on custom and the need to avoid ape-like imitation. The analogy of the growth of a tree might figure. Mill's discussion of the importance of eccentricity and non-conformity is likely to figure. Such non-conformity is needed to counter the dominance of average opinion and the 'tyranny' of public opinion. Eccentricity is a sign of mental vigour and courage; it should be pursued for its own sake.

Assessment Objective 3: 0–24 marks

Critical Discussion

- (1) Mill's descriptions of actions as 'best in themselves' or worthy as they are one's own, could be regarded as inconsistent with utilitarian considerations. The possibility of a clash between principles with examples might figure.
- (2) Mill might be accused of condoning the unusual/eccentric simply because it is unusual. Is this a sufficient justification?
- (3) Eccentricity could be a sign of mental weakness rather than strength. Examples might be used to question whether being different equates with being strong.
- (4) Logically, we cannot all be eccentric. It seems that eccentricity must derive its value from a general conformity and that it cannot be an option for all.
- (5) Mill's comments on eccentricity might be perfectly acceptable if all we mean by 'eccentric' is 'quaint' – but is all eccentric behaviour like this? Where do we draw the line and by whom is the line drawn?
- (6) It might be argued that on a wider level societies that have become highly individualistic have lost moral cohesion/identity. Historical examples could be used to show that such societies have become weak, decadent or vulnerable to attack. Or in support of Mill, total conformity, unthinking endorsement of tradition/custom, intolerance of non-conformity have also had dreadful consequences.
- (7) Mill fails to distinguish individual variation within a fixed background of stability from the variation of the background.
- (8) Mill overestimates rationality. In regard to experiments in living, people can make damaging choices. Some of these could be irreversible. Are they worth it simply because they are one's own? There might be some discussion of paternalism in general. In defence of Mill it might be argued that this is incompatible with ideals of democratic participation and personal responsibility.

- (9) Some customs have stood the test of time. Mill uses a similar argument elsewhere as a justification for his version of rule - utilitarianism.
- (10) Custom provides stability and that has social utility. It contributes to a cohesive society/provides a framework. It allows us to have firm expectations. There might be reference to a conservative view, eg Burke's notion of a partnership between the living and the dead.
- (11) Mill sees too close a connection between custom and despotism. Defence of Mill: he is warning us against the *blind* endorsement of custom and tradition. Such an endorsement is incompatible with the development of our mental faculties and does result in a despotism of the mind.
- (12) If custom is to be condemned, it should be as a result of what it involves – not just because it is custom.
- (13) There might be some reference to the freedoms which Mill regards as vital. Such a discussion needs to remain focused on the development of the individual rather than on tangential issues.

SECTION D: DESCARTES**Total for this question: (60 marks)**

10	Outline and illustrate Descartes' ontological argument.	<i>(15 marks)</i>
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Assessment Objective 1: 0–8 marks**Assessment Objective 2: 0–7 marks**

Candidates are expected to explain that this is an argument to establish the existence of God by pure reason.

The argument is a reformulation of Anselm's argument. It is a purely conceptual/*a priori* argument. He tries to argue *from* the concept *to* its actuality. God is defined as a perfect being. If he lacked existence he would lack a perfection (and thus not be the perfect being). Existence cannot be separated from the essential nature of God any more than the logically necessary properties of a triangle can be separated from it (also mountain/valley analogy). 'God exists' is logically necessary. He considers a possible objection: even if you cannot conceive of these things without their logically necessary properties, it does not follow that *in fact* there are such things. His thought cannot impose this. Reply: the concept of God is different, it is unique. Existence is inseparable from Him, therefore He *must* exist. (The only concept with existence is incorporated in its definition.)

EITHER

11	Assess whether Descartes establishes the existence of physical objects.	<i>(45 marks)</i>
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Assessment Objective 1: 0–10 marks**Assessment Objective 2: 0–11 marks**

Descartes offers a number of arguments that might be used, though he thinks that some of them are not convincing. Candidates may discuss any of the arguments which appear in the text. The argument from imagination: imagination is not part of his essence (mind) and must be directed at something other than mind. Body is postulated as the likely answer to what it is directed at or dependent upon.

Clear and distinct perceptions – we can conceive of material things in this way and God therefore has the power to make them so. There is also an appeal to our strong and natural inclination to believe, coupled with the claim that god is not a deceiver. Other arguments to which reference is made include the involuntariness and vividness of our perceptions, though Descartes is not convinced by such appeals. There may also be references to the faculties argument of Meditation 6.

Assessment Objective 3: 0–24 marks**Critical Discussion**

- (1) The argument from imagination is, at best, a probability argument and fails to satisfy the rigour of his arguments for the self and God.

- (2) An extension of (1): probabilistic arguments fail to meet the challenge of scepticism.
- (3) The appeal to strong, natural inclinations struggles in cases where they lead us astray. His own example of dropsy could be discussed. His physiological explanation is inadequate – a detailed discussion of the actual example is not required.
- (4) He fails to acknowledge that God *could* have made us in such a way that our instincts did not lead us astray.
- (5) It is philosophically desirable to have theories of perception that are independent of God.
- (6) God guarantees clear and distinct ideas but ‘God’ *is* a clear and distinct idea.
- (7) Descartes holds the secondary qualities thesis, but God has given us the inclination to believe that, eg objects are coloured. Is He a deceiver?
- (8) Criticism of the two towers or phantom limb arguments. They fail to establish that the objects of perception are ‘ideas’.
- (9) As an extension of (8): the general problem of establishing the existence of physical things when you hold a theory which drives a wedge between you and the external world.
- (10) ‘Vividness’ as a criterion would only succeed if we had *independent* reasons for knowing that vivid ideas matched real objects. Descartes realised the limitations of such appeals, eg images in dreams can be vivid or involuntary.

OR

12 ‘The mind may exist without the body.’ Examine whether Descartes succeeds in establishing dualism. <i>(45 marks)</i>

Assessment Objective 1: 0–10 marks

Assessment Objective 2: 0–11 marks

There are two claims that Descartes would want to make, (i) the mind is not identical with the body (brain), (ii) the mind is (causally) independent of the body.

The range of textual material is likely to include the knowledge argument in both its forms, the appeal to God’s omnipotence, the indivisibility argument. Descartes’ thesis is *substance* dualism and there may be some descriptive material regarding the different essential natures of mind and body. There may also be reference to the pilot/ship example but this needs to be properly understood as a disanalogy of the mind-body relation; there should be an associated reference to forming a whole/unity/intermingling.

Assessment Objective 3: 0–24 marks

Critical Discussion

- (1) The pilot/ship example could lead to a charge of inconsistency with Descartes' official position of two radically distinct substances.
- (2) The knowledge argument fails in both forms: Leibniz' Law fails in intentional contexts and things we know can be causally dependent on things we do not yet know. Illustrative examples should be used.
- (3) The failure of these arguments allows in the materialist claim that consciousness may depend on the brain. Examples can be used to support this thesis – effects of brain damage, surgery, etc.
- (4) As an extension of (3) candidates may select a materialist position and argue that Descartes fails to refute it. Identity theories or epiphenomenalism are likely candidates. The ensuing discussion needs to consider what Descartes said or what his counters might reasonably and consistently be. The response should not just juxtapose a contrary thesis.
- (5) The appeal to God's omnipotence is not satisfactory, (i) pre-supposes God, (ii) fails to establish that God has *used* his power.
- (6) The indivisibility argument is open to objections, eg split/multiple personalities, Freudian divisions. These are also open to objections, eg the claim that there can literally be two people in one body. A narrow but sustained discussion/engagement of these issues should be well rewarded.
- (7) Descartes does not justify the leap from thinking being an essential attribute to its being the sole attribute.
- (8) As he does not yet know that God exists, it follows that his mind is independent of God. This is totally unacceptable as the mind's dependence on God is a necessary condition for describing it as a distinct substance.
- (9) Problems with interactionism might be discussed, eg inadequacy of Descartes' appeal to the pineal gland, strengths of materialist position, logical difficulties with the concept of an immaterial substance.
- (10) Substance dualism leads to absurd ways of talking about people and cannot be accommodated by our conceptual structures. Alternatives might be discussed, eg the 'person' taken as the fundamental concept.
- (11) Strengths of dualist positions may be argued for, eg does justice to undeniable facts of consciousness, qualia, intentionality, the possibility of meaningful/structured experience.

SECTION E: NIETZSCHE**Total for this question: (60 marks)**

13 Explain what Nietzsche means by the will to power and why it is important. (15 marks)

Assessment Objective 1: 0–8 marks**Assessment Objective 2: 0–7 marks**

A number of textual sources might be used. The most important features are likely to be drawn from the following:

The will to power is organic, it is life itself, it is life-enhancing. Its importance is derived from its fundamental nature – our entire instinctual life is to be understood in terms of one basic form of the will, ie the will to power. All energies within us can be seen in terms of it. Nietzsche includes procreation and alimentation in this. To deny it results in false abstractions. All organic functions could be derived from it. To deny it is to deny life itself. Any belief system which denies this, denies life itself (Christianity). There may be some discussion of Nietzsche's remarks on exploitation and belief systems which reverse the natural order. The will to power is universal and unconditional. It is a basic fact which is beyond good and evil. The history of moral philosophy has been initiated by a failure to recognise this fact. There may be some references to evolutionary theory.

EITHER

14 Assess whether it is right to claim that Nietzsche has provided a confused and incomplete account of religious belief. (45 marks)

Assessment Objective 1: 0–10 marks**Assessment Objective 2: 0–11 marks**

A number of diverse textual sources might serve as the basis for the discussion. Religion is described as an ongoing suicide of reason. It involves the sacrifice of freedom, pride and spiritual self-confidence. There might be references to the ladder of sacrifice. Religion is described as a neurosis; it involves a denial of the world and the will (solitude, abstinence). It is responsible for superstition and nonsense. There are lurid and negative descriptions – the saint (though here there is a redeeming feature). Religious belief is attributed to instinctual fear – the will to untruth at any price. Religion can, however, have its uses. The new philosopher can use it as a form of control. It is a means to an end, not an end in itself. There are likely to be negative comments about Christianity in particular – the reversal of moral values, its contribution to the production of the sickly, mediocre European.

Assessment Objective 3: 0–24 marks**Critical Discussion**

- (1) Describing religious practices when removed from their context will produce absurdities, but the same is true for *any* practice treated in this way. Philosophical gains can only be made by arguing against the context itself.

- (2) Although Nietzsche appears to be a perspectivist, this does not prevent him from making rationality judgements regarding entire belief systems. The consistency of this approach/position might be discussed.
- (3) Attempts have been made to render religious faith rational – or at least not irrational (eg Aquinas, James). Nietzsche neglects any philosophical analyses of these attempts. They are not to be dismissed by merely appealing to the motives of their proponents.
- (4) His account is incomplete as Nietzsche neglects some reasons or motives for religious belief. It can provide a unified world view, a scientist may see himself unfolding God's plan; it might provide a fundamental reason for why there should be anything at all, or provide a satisfactory explanation of the phenomenological aspects of conscience.
- (5) The ladder of religious sacrifice omits the most important sacrifice, that of God for man. Or, the concept of sacrifice is too narrow as an explanation of more developed religious systems.
- (6) If all Nietzsche's perspectivism requires of a belief system is that it is life-enhancing, then this could be claimed by the religions. There would then be nothing left to say. To claim that such belief systems could not be life-enhancing may involve an absolutist notion of what it is to be life-enhancing.
- (7) If adopting religious belief helps the weak escape Nietzsche's new morality, then the weak should pursue it as a matter of rational self-interest.
- (8) Religion has to be regarded as an end in itself, otherwise the entire situation collapses and it would no longer be recognisable as religion. (There might be comparisons of purposive accounts of morality).
- (9) Nietzsche is primarily concerned with the psychology of religion and it is not clear how one moves from this approach to philosophical judgements regarding rationality. The appeals to instincts hardly advances matters. What is the evidence for such instincts other than the actions they are intended to explain?
- (10) There may be neo-Wittgensteinian/Winch type criticisms of describing entire belief systems as irrational. Each area has internal criteria for making judgements of rationality.
- (11) Equally appalling and lurid descriptions could be used to illustrate Nietzsche's perspective.
- (12) Nietzsche neglects arguments for the existence of God. Even if none of these is decisive, some may still pose questions – there could be some reference to issues in the design argument that have emerged recently.

OR

- 15** '...we have duties only towards our peers, and that we may treat those of lower rank, anything foreign, as we think best or "as our heart dictates" or in any event beyond good and evil.'
Critically examine the ethical implications of Nietzsche's account of master morality.
(45 marks)

Assessment Objective 1: 0–10 marks

Assessment Objective 2: 0–11 marks

There are two basic traits or moral codes to which all others ultimately reduce: master and slave morality. These can co-exist within the same society, even within the same individual. On the master's definition of 'good', certain noble traits predominate – proud states of the soul, aristocratic morality. The individual not the action is the subject of moral judgement (three stages of morality). Moral historians have inverted the true relation. The masters determine value – as distinct from receivers of value. Importance of severity and consistent application (Viking example). Slave morality is borne out of fear and self-protection. Pity, kindness and humility become values. Evil is seen in terms of evoking fear – good in master morality. Life involves exploitation as its essence – an organic function of the will to power and thus beyond good and evil.

Assessment Objective 3: 0–24 marks

Critical Discussion

- (1) Nietzsche's account is 'beyond' morality but yet carries implications regarding the treatment of others. It could be argued that any such account is inescapably/irreducibly moral. This also opens up the possibility of rejection on moral grounds (Russell).
- (2) A related point would be that there is a strain in Nietzsche in giving an account which is both moral and non-moral.
- (3) If we regard Nietzsche's account as beyond morality, then how can it have any implications for how anyone should behave? There is a fact/value issue. Some of the concepts we learn are inherently moral and cannot be used purely descriptively in relation to organic processes or anything else.
- (4) The centrality of exploitation can be questioned. Nietzsche does not establish that this is the essence of life. Alternatives are possible (if there is an essence).
- (5) Nietzsche's treatment of the weak is regarded as an organic function. This could be regarded as an intrusion of pseudo-science or evolutionary principles into ethics, eg Spencer's justification of the genocide of American Indians in terms of survival of the fittest. Such judgements are ultimately moral no matter how they are disguised.
- (6) There are problems in distinguishing psychological types from the actions they perform – sufficient problems to call into question Nietzsche's history of morals.
- (7) Nietzsche's account is naïve or romantic. You cannot simply transport values from one social epoch to another; you cannot even understand them as values without

understanding/ participating in the social network in which they are generated. Viking values were admirable *in* Viking society.

- (8) Nietzsche's thesis is open to similar objections raised by Socrates against Callicles, eg the herd are now the stronger.
- (9) The thesis has unacceptable social and political implications. If nation states behaved in this way we would have a recipe for international strife and chaos.

ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE GRID

A2 Assessment Objective	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 15-mark Question	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 45-mark question	Total Marks by Assessment Objective
AO1	8	10	18
AO2	7	11	18
AO3	0	24	24
Total	15	45	60